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COPYRIGHT CONSULTATIONS SUBMISSION
Samuel E. Trosow *

In this submission, the author revisits and expands on various points
highlighted during a roundtable session in Toronto relating to copyright
reform. In doing so, he raises and responds to several fundamental questions
affecting copyright law, including those relating to the modernization of
existing copyright law, technological neutrality, changes that can foster
innovation, creativity, competition and investment in Canada and
consequently position Canada as a technological leader. The author then
moves on to consider the notion of fair dealing, focusing specifically on the
need to make current categories under the fair dealing provisions illustrative
rather than exhaustive. Moreover, he argues for the need to include the list
of factors endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada‘s fair dealing
provisions. Lastly, the author touches on a variety of issues that he argues are
necessary to address in order to ensure that fair dealing rights in Canada are
not undermined.

In this submission, I will expand on the points I raised at the
Round-Table session in Toronto on August 27th.1 In the first part, I
will briefly address the five questions around which this consultation
is organized. The second section will focus on fair-dealing, specifically
the need to make the current categories illustrative instead of
exhaustive and to include the list of factors endorsed by the Supreme
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Court of Canada in the text of the Copyright Act2. Finally, I will touch
on some other issues that need to be addressed in order to ensure that
fair dealing rights are not undermined.
I.

ADDRESSING THE FIVE QUESTIONS

My responses to the third, fourth and fifth questions have
been combined since there is much overlap. There are some recurring
themes that come up in response to all of them; that is, the need for
technological neutrality, the need to keep the laws simple and easy to
understand, and, perhaps above all, the principle of ―do no harm.‖
1. HOW DO CANADA‘S COPYRIGHT LAWS AFFECT YOU? HOW
SHOULD EXISTING LAWS BE MODERNIZED?
As a teacher, researcher and avid reader, my work consists in
large part in creating and using copyrighted materials, very often in
an iterative and transformative manner. As the fields of law and
librarianship are both situated in information-intensive environments,
the rules governing the creation, transfer, use, storage and re-use of
information resources has a profound effect in both of the disciplines
in which I teach and conduct research.
Personally, in the course of preparing for my teaching, as well
as in the course of conducting my research, I am constantly engaging
with existing works in which copyright subsists (or once subsisted)
and I am constantly creating new ones. The result is the delivery of
instruction to students who are going through similar processes as
well as the creation of new works in which copyright will temporarily
subsist. It is becoming increasingly difficult to segment those aspects
of my work where I am a ―user‖ of copyrighted works from those
situations where I am a ―creator‖ of new works, be they articles,
books, or instructional materials. While the speed in which one is
constantly going back and forth between these previously more
separate roles is being increased by new technology, the need for
―balanced‖ copyright laws becomes more evident. The term
―balanced‖ may seem to be getting a bit over-used; perhaps it is
Copyright Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42 [Copyright Act]. Unless stated otherwise, all
references to an "Act" are to the Copyright Act.
2
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becoming a truism to say that copyright policy should strive to be
―balanced.‖ But given the increasingly tenuous state of the old
creator-user dichotomy, not only in particular academic fields but in
society as a whole covering a broad range of activities, the search for
this ―balance‖ becomes all the more important. Copyright laws, which
should be designed to promote learning, culture and progress, to
provide incentives for intellectual activity, and to reward creators for
their efforts, need to be carefully crafted, implemented and assessed so
that it does not impede the very purposes it was intended to promote.
In modernizing the law, I think it is important not to become
too fixated on the particulars of the technologies of the day, or the
minutiae of particular institutional settings, but to keep focused on the
way in which people are generally becoming integrated creators and
users of information resources.
Another reason why it is important to avoid legislative overdrafting is that the law needs to be kept simple enough so it can be
broadly understood. As the roles of users and creators become more
and more integrated, most Canadians will truly want to consistently
engage in fair copyright practices. But respect for the law is eroded by
those long cryptic passages that dwell on technical details and contain
rules, exceptions, conditions, and counter exceptions, etc. Any
attempt to ―modernize‖ the law should recognize the need to
encourage the population to learn the law and take some ownership
and responsibility for it. This is best accomplished through the
enunciation of clear and consistent principles that people can adopt
and use in their daily lives.
2.
BASED ON CANADIAN VALUES AND INTERESTS, HOW SHOULD
COPYRIGHT CHANGES BE MADE IN ORDER TO WITHSTAND THE TEST OF
TIME?
Copyright laws must be technologically neutral. The pace of
technological change is such that provisions that become mired in
technology-specific detail will quickly become outdated (like the dry
erase board and flip chart exception in section 29.4 added in 1997).3
The same can be said for provisions that are overly-specific to
particular institutional settings. As for Canadian values and interests,
3

Copyright Act, supra note 2, s. 29.4.
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any changes to the law must reflect the broad concerns of the
Canadian public, a public that is increasingly engaging in information
and media resources in interactive ways.
In terms of standing the test of time and the related goal of
technological neutrality, it is useful to look at some bad examples of
provisions from Bill C-614 which were unduly specific to particular
technologies and institutions. These included sections 29.21, 29.22,
29.23, 30.01, 30.02, 30.04 and the labyrinth exceptions to the anticircumvention rules. While these provisions may have been well
meaning, they basically tended to give people specific rights that they
already had and then purported to limit them through onerous and
complex conditions and counter-exceptions. These types of provisions
should be avoided.
3-4-5. WHAT SORTS OF COPYRIGHT CHANGES DO YOU BELIEVE WOULD
BEST FOSTER INNOVATION, CREATIVITY, COMPETITION AND
INVESTMENT IN CANADA AND BEST POSITION CANADA AS A
LEADER IN THE GLOBAL, DIGITAL ECONOMY?
The goals of fostering innovation and creativity are closely
linked to promoting competition and investment in Canada, which in
turn relate to Canada's position in the global, digital economy.
A primary concern in all of these areas should be to ―do no
harm.‖ We should reject the often-stated premise that the Canadian
Act is somehow broken, outdated, or in need of major revision. In
fact, the current law has worked relatively well, and while there is
always room for improvement, it is hardly the crisis situation that
some stakeholders bemoan. We do not see some of the more overly
litigious behaviours that have become evident in the United States as a
result of some of their legislative changes of the late 1990's. We also
see evidence of thriving economic activity in Canada in the areas of
consumer electronics, games development, the provision of internet
services, computer and security research and the promotion of
Canadian content in the arts and entertainment sector. So despite all

Bill C-61, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act, 2nd Sess., 39th Parl., 2007-2008 [Bill
C-61]. Bill C-61 was introduced to Parliament in June 2008 though died on the order
paper after passing First Reading as a result of the September, 2008 election.
4

172

of the hand-wringing about how out-of-date our copyright laws are,
some historical perspective is needed.
This is not the first time in history when technological
changes challenge existing ways of doing things, when changes on the
international stage suggest revisions to domestic laws are needed, or
when economic uncertainty is cause for concern about existing laws.
Before Parliament makes any drastic changes to Canada's
copyright laws, a real problem in need of a legislative solution should
be identified and the potential consequences of the proposed solution
should be considered. It is not enough to speak vaguely about
international obligations, keeping up with trading partners, or the
woes and downturns faced by certain industries. Rather the burden
should be on proponents for any changes to demonstrate that their
proposals are reasonable, warranted, and that some thought has been
given to the consequences that are likely to flow from the measure,
especially if we can look at the experiences in other countries that
have adopted the measure. It should also be the responsibility of
proponents of amendments to frame their proposals as specifically as
possible.
Staying the course on some existing policies may well be the
best solution in many cases. For example, proponents of DMCA-style
anti-circumvention measures (complete with device prohibitions, and
draconian penalties with only specific and limited exemptions) have
not met their burden of showing the need for these sorts of changes.
They need to do so in terms of the specific benefits that will accrue to
Canadians. What are the specific instances of competitive advantage
that will accrue to Canada, and how do these benefits balance against
potential losses or harms? Amendments that are designed primarily to
preserve obsolete business models may just as well end up stifling new
ideas or having other unanticipated consequences.
This is not to say that Canada should never look to other
countries for ideas in terms of how their copyright laws are operating.
But Parliament does need to pick and choose very carefully. The
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (―DMCA‖)5 is a bad law not
because it is American. It is a bad law because of its specific terms and
because the U.S. Congress did not pay adequate attention to its

5

Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. (1998) [DMCA].
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implications in its headlong rush to implement the WIPO Treaties6 in
such an excessive manner.
Along the same lines, utilizing restraint in its approach to
copyright amendments would better position Canada as a leader in
the global digital economy than taking a purely maximalist position
and copying the worst aspects of U.S. policies. Canada should adopt a
decidedly minimalist approach on the issue of WIPO implementation,
perhaps focusing on some of the performers' issues in this current
legislative round. As the years go by, some of the provisions of the
WIPO treaties (those dealing with technological protections and
rights management) seem increasingly archaic, geared more towards
what some thought were the technological imperatives of the mid1990's than a forward-looking set of principles that would stand the
test of time. Also, given some of the rethinking evident in WIPO over
the past few years, as notably evidenced by the success of the
Development Agenda, one wonders whether the same language
would even pass muster if a Diplomatic Conference were held today.
In any event, to read the WIPO Treaty as requiring the excess of the
DMCA (particularly with respect to the broad sweep of the anticircumventions to include otherwise lawful activities as well as device
prohibitions) is not warranted. It is evident that the DMCA went well
beyond the actual requirements of the WIPO Treaties with respect to
technological protection measures. There is no reason why Canada
should be under any compulsion to repeat the same mistake.
To answer this set of questions positively though, there are
some changes that would improve the Act's ability to foster
competition and investment, encourage creativity and innovation, and
best position Canada as a leader in the global, digital economy.
Most particularly, the Act should be amended so that the fair
dealing provisions correspond with the direction of the Supreme
Court of Canada as well as correspond with the reality of Canadian
practice. This change is of central importance because all of these
goals (innovation, creativity, investment, competition, global
leadership) are best met by turning Canada into a haven for the
practice of fair copyright. Canadians in all walks of life should be
encouraged to engage in fair copyright practices. Practising fair
copyright, which may take on different forms in different contexts,
WIPO Copyright Treaty, 20 December 1996, 36 ILM 65; WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty, 20 December 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76.
6
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should become the hallmark of a Canadian copyright culture that
reflects Canadian values.
II.

ENCOURAGING THE PRACTICE OF FAIR COPYRIGHT BY
AMENDING THE FAIR DEALING PROVISIONS

Section 29 of the Act provides that ―fair dealing for the
purpose of research or private study does not infringe copyright.‖7
Section 29.1 and 29.2 similarly provide that fair dealing for purposes
of criticism or review and news reporting does not infringe copyright
if the source and name of the author (or performer, maker or
broadcaster) is given.
Fair dealing in Canada is therefore categorical; one must first
come within one of the categories listed in the Act in order to invoke
fair dealing. And assuming you have invoked one of these categories,
the Act is silent as to the actual criteria to use in determining whether
or not the use is indeed fair. You have to look to the case law for
guidance.
This state of affairs runs counter to popular belief; people
often talk about fair dealing by noting that they have not used very
much of the source, that the original work was transformed to a great
extent, or that the use was not commercial in nature. While these
types of factors are relevant for assessing whether a particular use was
―fair‖, under a strict interpretation of the Canadian Act they only
come into play if the use fits within one of the five enumerated
categories. Some of this popular confusion comes from the difference
between American ―fair use‖ and Canadian ―fair dealing.‖ In contrast
to Canada‘s categorical requirement, U.S. fair-use is open-ended, that
is, you do not have to fit into a stated category, you go right to the
assessment of whether or not the use was fair under the
circumstances.
Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act provides:
. . . fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other
means specified by [section 106], for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including

7

Copyright Act, supra note 1, s. 29.
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multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research,
is not an infringement of copyright... 8

Note the open ended usage of the words ‗such as‘. The section
then goes on to specify how fair use is determined. Whether or not a
particular use will be considered fair is dependant on several
enumerated factors:
In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall
include-(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.9

Here again, the text of the U.S. Copyright Act is open-ended.
While four factors are set forth, they are preceded by the important
signal words shall include, inviting a consideration other factors that
may be pertinent. It is suggested that this open-ended nature of fairuse, both in terms of what it applies to and how it is determined is a
good feature because of its simplicity, technological neutrality, and its
ultimate emphasis on the fairness of the use itself
The policy question facing Parliament is whether this
important users right be strictly restricted to certain limited categories
as a threshold requirement, or whether the categories and the open
ended approach of section 107 should be adopted.
The answer to the question really depends on what purpose
fair-dealing is supposed to serve. If it is simply a technical defence to
an infringement action to be sparingly used, then the strict categorical
approach is compatible. However, if the purpose of fair-dealing is to
provide some balance into the Act by articulating and giving
substance to an important users' right, then the categories should be

8
9

Copyright Act, U.S.C. 17, § 107 (2006).
Ibid.
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relaxed and the emphasis should be shifted to the actual fairness of the
use.
In Canada, the fair dealing categories of research, private
study, criticism, review and news reporting were traditionally
construed in a narrow manner. Throughout the twentieth century,
fair dealing was consistently viewed in Canadian courts and legal
circles as nothing more than a limited defence to infringement. Courts
strictly construed fair-dealing because they felt it was a limited
exception to the more significant rights of the copyright owner. But
this judicial deference towards owners rights has shifted in recent
years. In 2002, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that the proper
balance in Copyright
... lies not only in recognizing the creator‘s rights but in
giving due weight to their limited nature. In crassly
economic terms it would be as inefficient to
overcompensate artists and authors for the right of
reproduction as it would be self-defeating to
undercompensate them.10

The court went on to state that:
[e]xcessive control by holders of copyrights and other forms
of intellectual property may unduly limit the ability of the
public domain to incorporate and embellish creative
innovation in the long-term interests of society as a whole,
or create practical obstacles to proper utilization. 11

While Théberge was a split decision which did not deal
directly with fair dealing, the opinion foreshadowed the unanimous
decision of the court two years later.
In 2004 the Supreme Court directly addressed fair dealing in
CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada12, where the
provision of a fee-based document delivery service maintained by a
law library was held to constitute fair dealing. In an important
passage, the court stated:
Théberge v. Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain inc. , [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336 at para. 31.
Ibid., at para. 32.
12 CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339 [CCH
Canadian Ltd].
10
11
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... Procedurally, a defendant is required to prove that his or
her dealing with a work has been fair; however, the fair
dealing exception is perhaps more properly understood as
an integral part of the Act than simply a defence. Any act
falling within the fair dealing exception will not be an
infringement of copyright. The fair dealing exception, like
other exceptions in the Act, is a user‘s right. In order to
maintain the proper balance between the rights of a
copyright owner and users‘ interests, it must not be
interpreted restrictively.13

The court went on to quote and adopt Professor David Vaver‘s
observation that: ―[u]ser rights are not just loopholes. Both owner
rights and user rights should therefore be given the fair and balanced
reading that befits remedial legislation.‖14
In reaching its ultimate conclusion that the copying of the
plaintiffs' works for private law firms by the library constituted fair
dealing, a number of other important points were made by the court
which are relevant to this consultation.
For example, the court indicated that fair dealing is always
available, even where there is a more specific special exemption
which could be applicable. The court said,
As an integral part of the scheme of copyright law, the s. 29
fair dealing exception is always available. Simply put, a
library can always attempt to prove that its dealings with a
copyrighted work are fair under s. 29 of the Act. It is only if
a library were unable to make out the fair dealing exception
under s. 29 that it would need to turn to s. 30.2 of the Act to
prove that it qualified for the library exemption. 15

With respect to the enumerated categories, the court stated
that they must not be strictly construed. They stated that ―'Research'
must be given a large and liberal interpretation in order to ensure that
users‘ rights are not unduly constrained.‖16 While the case before the
court dealt specifically with the category of research, this reasoning
Ibid., at para. 48.
Ibid.
15 Ibid., at para. 49.
16 Ibid., at para. 51.
13
14
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should equally apply to situations where the scope of private study,
criticism, review or news reporting is being considered.
The court also grappled with the lack of clear definition of the
fairness factors in the Act itself. They adopted the six factors used by
the Court of Appeals to
be considered in assessing whether a dealing was fair: (1)
the purpose of the dealing; (2) the character of the dealing;
(3) the amount of the dealing; (4) alternatives to the dealing;
(5) the nature of the work; and (6) the effect of the dealing
on the work. Although these considerations will not all
arise in every case of fair dealing, this list of factors provides
a useful analytical framework to govern determinations of
fairness in future cases.17

What is significant here is that several opponents of
expanding fair dealing have expressed worries that by relaxing the
categories and opening up fair-dealing, everything would become free
to use. This concern is simply misplaced. The open-ended and flexible
fair dealing advocated here still has to meet the factual tests of
fairness. There is nothing automatic about fair-dealing. It is not freedealing, you still have to make a showing under these factors that
your use meets the fairness criteria.
The other misconception that has been raised during the
course of the consultation is that once a license is readily available,
there should be no claim to fair dealing. This was characterized by
some observers as ―smart‖ fair dealing. This issue is especially salient
given the importance of collective licensing in Canada. But the issue
of the effect of the availability of a license on the fair dealing claim
was addressed by the CCH Court directly:
The availability of a licence is not relevant to deciding
whether a dealing has been fair. As discussed, fair dealing is
an integral part of the scheme of copyright law in Canada.
Any act falling within the fair dealing exception will not
infringe copyright. If a copyright owner were allowed to
license people to use its work and then point to a person‘s
decision not to obtain a licence as proof that his or her
dealings were not fair, this would extend the scope of the
17

Ibid., at para. 53.
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owner‘s monopoly over the use of his or her work in a
manner that would not be consistent with the Act‘s balance
between owner‘s rights and user‘s interests. 18

Going back to the threshold policy facing Parliament with
respect to the nature of fair-dealing, I would suggest that the Supreme
Court has effectively answered the question in a very compelling,
authoritative and persuasive manner. What is clear now is that fair
dealing in Canada is no longer simply a technical defence to an
infringement action, it is in itself a substantive users' right that is an
integral part of the whole of the Act.
As a result, we have an unfortunate disconnect between the
actual state of copyright law as it is construed in the courts, and the
actual text of the Act itself. This discrepancy should be harmonized so
the Act reflects the case-law as set down by the Supreme Court. Not
only is there a discrepancy between the text of the Act and the
Supreme Court case-law, but there is a whole set of discrepancies
between common ordinary everyday practices of Canadians and the
text of the Act. For example, while it is common practice to utilize
VCR and other types of recorders in the home, it is not at all clear
how such use fits neatly within any of the enumerated categories of
research, private study, criticism, review or news reporting. Yet these
devices are lawfully sold by Canadian retailers and purchased and
used routinely by Canadian consumers. There are many other
examples of how typical information usage practices do not neatly fit
within the narrow confines of the fair dealing provisions of the Act as
it was drafted.
One set of options is to draft specific language to address
particular situations. But as discussed above, and as reflected in so
many of the submissions in this consultation, such detail is not in
keeping with the stated goals of simplicity, technological neutrality
and standing the test of time. The provisions which would have added
sections 29.21, 29.22 and 29.23 in Bill C-61 exemplified this flawed
technology-specific approach that should be rejected in favour of
general principles that can be applied in a variety of circumstances.
It is proposed that sections 29, 29.1 and 29.2 be replaced with
the following:

18

Ibid., at para. 70.
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Section 29: Fair Dealing
(1) Fair dealing for purposes such as research, private study,
criticism, review or news reporting does not infringe
copyright.
(2) In determining whether the use made in any particular
case is fair-dealing, the factors to be considered may include—
(a) the purpose of the dealing,
(b) the character of the dealing,
(c) the amount of the dealing,
(d) the nature of the work or other subject matter,
(e) alternatives to the dealing,
(f) the effect of the dealing on the work or other subject
matter,
(g) the extent to which attribution was made where
reasonable in the circumstances.
This proposal avoids having to pick and choose between a
whole range of worthy candidates for inclusion to the enumerated
list. Using the words of inclusion such as shows an intention that the
stated categories are merely illustrative examples, not exhaustive
categories. In subsection (2), the listing is generally adopted from
paragraph 53 of the CCH decision. The attribution criteria in
subsection (2)(g) is in lieu of the requirement in the current text. The
term may in subsection (2) is used to reflect the statement from the
Supreme Court that not every factor will be present in every case.
III.

AVOID OTHER PROVISIONS THAT WILL TEND TO UNDERMINE
FAIR-DEALING

In this last section I will briefly identify some other issues that
should considered for inclusion (or exclusion as the case may be) in
revisions to the Act that are necessary in order to protect the integrity
of fair dealing.

1. Limit the availability of statutory damages in situations where there
is a reasonable and good faith belief that an act constituted fair
dealing.
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Unfortunately, many Canadians are not willing to exercise
their existing fair-dealing rights because they are afraid of the
financial liability that can result from an award of statutory damages.
Accordingly, for fair dealing rights to be at all meaningful, this
chilling effect needs to be ameliorated. Statutory damages should not
be available in situations where a person had a reasonable and good
faith belief that their use constituted fair-dealing. This should
especially be the case where the use was done pursuant to a stated
institutional policy on fair-dealing practices.

2. There should be no liability for acts of circumvention where the use
constitutes fair dealing.
Fair dealing rights should not be vitiated by new liability rules
pertaining to the circumvention of technological protection measures.
Many submissions have made the point that any implementation of
the WIPO Treaties with respect to anti-circumvention measures
should be limited to situations that otherwise constitute actionable
infringement. This more moderate approach was used in Bill C-60.19 A
user should be free to exercise their fair dealing or other rights
without being impeded by the use of technological measures designed
to limit access to or copying of a work or other subject matter. And
any prohibitions which are adopted should not extend to devices or
services that have non-infringing uses or which would come within
the scope of fair-dealing or another exemption or limitation.

3. Special Exemptions should be generally avoided.
Bill C-61 proposed numerous several special exemptions
which contained their own counter limitations and conditions.20
These sections included sections 29.21, 29.22, 29.23, 30.01, 30.02,
30.04 as well as the various exceptions to the anti-circumvention
rules. These sections would be unnecessary under open-ended fair
dealing. Generally, exemptions which are limited to particular types
of technologies, or only available in particular institutional settings,
are the types of special exemptions that should be avoided.

19
20

Bill C-60, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act, 1st Sess., 38th Parl., 2005.
Bill C-61, supra note 4.
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In particular, calls for a special Internet Exception that would
only be available to certain enumerated educational institutions
should be rejected. The same fair copyright practices should apply at
home as at school. Educational institutions do not need special
exemptions to promote teaching and learning, rather they should be
adopting their own sets of best practices for determining what does
and does not constitute fair-dealing.

4. Consider limitations on standard form contracts which defeat fairdealing
Standard Form Contracts are often imposed on purchasers of
digital goods through ―shrinkwrap‖ or ―click-wrap‖ licenses which
contain terms and conditions in derogation of users' rights under the
Act. The Act should be amended to provide that such contracts are
void as contrary to public policy to the extent they exclude or limit
statutory user‘s rights.

5. Internet Service Liability rules must not impede fair dealing rights
or chill protected expression
There is currently much discussion between proponents of
―Notice and Take-Down‖ and ―Notice and Notice.‖ I will not expand
on it here other than to indicate that ―Notice and Take-Down‖ does
not adequately account for those uses that may be fair dealing. Notice
and Notice seems to be a reasonable compromise on this issue.
Proposals such as ―three strikes‖ must also be rejected as it would tend
to place chill on protected fair dealing and other expression rights
online.

6. Crown Copyright should be reformed or abolished
While the potential severity of Crown Copyright has been
lessened by several orders which grant broad licenses to use certain
materials such as statutes, regulations and case-law, these limitations
on Crown Copyright need to be extended to other types of
government documents.
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